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ABSTRACT 
The 21st century has ushered in an era of new maritime challenges for the U. S. Navy, 
requiring the ability to maintain situational awareness over the world’s maritime domain.  
The need for global Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) has highlighted gaps in 
existing organic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection 
capabilities within the Navy.  To fill this capability gap, the Navy has initiated a 
recapitalization plan of its airborne ISR force to leverage the technological capabilities of 
unmanned systems, of which the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned 
Aircraft System (UAS) is an integral part. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze the cost implications of the 
acquisition of the BAMS UAS for the Navy’s Flying Hour Program (FHP) and the 
Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) budget by developing an Operations and 
Support (O&S) cost estimation methodology for the BAMS UAS.  Additionally, this 
thesis analyzes some of the financial and support impacts of this weapon system within 
the context of the funding challenges the Navy will face in managing the FHP and OMN 
budget accounts in the near future. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The 21st century has ushered in an era of new maritime challenges for the U.S., requiring 
the ability to maintain situational awareness over the world’s maritime domain.  The need 
for global Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) has highlighted gaps in existing organic 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities within the 
Navy.  To fill this capability gap, the Navy and the Department of Defense (DoD) have 
initiated a recapitalization plan that is leveraging existing technology and capabilities 
inherent in UASs to meet the growing demands for ISR missions in support of the war-
fighter.  What is unknown is how the growing inventory of UASs may affect funding and 
resource decision making for the FHP and the OMN budget in the future.  To limit the 
scope of this thesis, a single UAS program, the BAMS UAS, was identified to examine 
the cost consequences of fielding this new system. 
This thesis developed a cost-estimation methodology for BAMS O&S costs, and 
applied this methodology using analogous manned aircraft data from the P-3C to project 
a BAMS cost per hour estimate.  Next, it analyzed the required level of FHP funding to 
support BAMS missions specified in its CONOPS and examined the impacts the BAMS 
UAS will have on the Navy OMN budget. 
The following impacts were identified: 
1). In FY14 the BAMS UAS program will begin to require $2.2 million in FHP 
funding, growing to $237.3 million by FY24.  If the FHP remains on a steady funding 
trend, the BAMS program will require over 6 percent of overall FHP funding when 
system acquisition is complete and all BAMS squadrons are operational. 
2). The current assumption is that BAMS fleet integration will occur without 
replacing any existing aviation capability to off-set its growing FHP resource 
requirements 
3). Three areas were identified that the BAMS UAS will directly affect within the 
OMN budget.  These three areas are: (a) larger associated Program Related Engineering 
and Program Related Logistics costs versus existing manned aircraft, (b) increased usage 
 xvi
and support costs associated with commercial wideband satellite communication links, 
and (c) potential significant manpower cost increases if Contractor Operational Support 
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The 21st century has ushered in an era of new maritime challenges for the U.S. 
Navy.  The Cold War conventional blue water threat has been superseded by global, 
asymmetric, non-state actors that threaten the security of the world’s ports and shipping 
lanes on the high seas and in littoral regions, potentially jeopardizing global economic 
stability (Kreisher, 2008, p. 12).  These growing challenges to maritime access require a 
shift away from focusing only on an adversary’s or potential peer competitor’s naval 
assets, to having awareness of the entire maritime domain to ensure the ability to obtain 
sea control, a fundamental pillar of U.S. naval strategy.  This need for global Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) has highlighted gaps in organic Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities within the Navy (Mullen, 2007, p. 3).  
To fill this capability gap, the Navy initiated a recapitalization plan of its airborne ISR 
force to provide worldwide MDA, of which the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
(BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) will be an integral part (PMA-262b, 2007, 
1).  Under current projections, the BAMS UAS program will reach its Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) in 2016, and will have a four-year ramp-up to Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) in 2020 by standing up one operational ISR orbit per year (PMA-262b, 
2007, p. 5). 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. System Role 
The BAMS UAS will play a vital role in the Navy’s future war-fighting 
capability.  It will support the Navy’s concept of Sea Power 21 including Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield, Sea Basing, and will be a critical enabler of FORCEnet (PMA-262a, 2007, p. 2).  
FORCEnet is the Navy’s architectural framework and emerging operational concept for 
warfare in the information age.  BAMS will be integral to the Navy’s Maritime Patrol and 
Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) tasked mission requirement to provide persistent 
maritime ISR to supported operational and tactical war-fighters such as Joint Forces 
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Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Surface Strike 
Groups (SSG), and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) (PMA-262b, 2007, p. 9).  The 
BAMS is envisioned as part of a MPRF future Family of Systems (FoS) consisting of 
manned and unmanned aircraft that will support the increased war-fighter demand for 
persistent ISR.  As part of this MPRF FoS, the BAMS force structure currently under 
development envisions an integrated MPRF organizational unit to leverage existing 
infrastructure.  Thus, the current operational concept for the BAMS program consists of 
co-locating its main operating bases with P-3C and future P-8A home bases and primary 
deployment sites to allow flight crews to coordinate missions synergistically (PMA-262b, 
2007, p. 4).  These notional main operating locations, shown in Figure 1, include: 
 Second Fleet—Jacksonville, FL 
 Third Fleet— Kaneohe Bay, HI, Whidbey Island, WA, or Beale Air Force 
Base, CA 
 Fifth Fleet—United Arab Emirates, Qatar, or Djibouti 
  Sixth Fleet—Rota, Spain or Sigonella, Italy 
 Seventh Fleet—Kadena, Japan or Guam 
 
Figure 1.   Notional BAMS UAS Main Operating Bases 
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Additionally, the BAMS communication suite will provide both payload data and 
communications management capabilities, allowing for mission information to be sent 
directly to afloat or in the field forces providing critical data to support Intelligence 
Preparation of the Environment (IPE) and maintaining a Common Operational and 
Tactical Picture (COTP) of the maritime battlespace (PMA-262b, 2007, p. 9).  As a 
communication management asset, the BAMS will have the ability to perform Airborne 
Communications Relay (ACR) between Joint Forces, linking two nodes that are beyond 
the line of sight for direct communication with each other. 
2. System Components 
The BAMS UAS will be an integrated system of systems incorporating the 
following: (1) a land-based High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Air 
Vehicle (UAV) HALE refers to the ability to fly above 50,000 feet with a flight 
endurance greater than 24 hours, (2) a suite of interactive mission payloads, (3) a suite of 
communication systems for Line of Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) 
capabilities, and (4) a Mission Control Station (MCS) used for mission planning, mission 
execution, and post-mission analysis (PMA-262a, 2007, p. 8).  The anticipated payload 
suite consists of a 270-degree minimum Field of Regard (FOR) multi-mode maritime 
radar, 270-degree FOR high performance electro-optical and infrared camera, 360-degree 
FOR electronic support measures system, and a 360-degree FOR automatic identification 
system combined with airborne processing and satellite communication links to provide 
near real time intelligence capabilities (PMA-262a, 2007, p. 8).  A complete BAMS UAS 
is defined as having sufficient assets to provide continuous operations up to 24 hours a 
day, over operating areas anywhere within a 2000 Nautical Mile (NM) radius of its base, 
with no more than three UAVs aloft simultaneously (PMA-262a, 2007, p. vi). 
B. PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze the cost implications 
of the acquisition of BAMS UAS on the Flying Hour Program (FHP) and Operation and 
Maintenance, Navy (OMN) budget accounts.  The Navy and DoD have initiated an 
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aviation recapitalization plan that is leveraging existing technology and capabilities 
inherent in UASs to meet the growing demands for ISR missions in support of the war-
fighter.  What is unknown is how the growing inventory of UASs may affect funding and 
resource decision making for the FHP and the OMN budget in the future.  This thesis 
develops an O&S cost estimation methodology for the BAMS UAS and applies this 
method to analyze the impacts of this single weapon system on Navy FHP and OMN 
budget accounts. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis addresses the following research questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the cost implications of the Navy’s planned acquisition of the BAMS 
UAS for the Navy Flying Hour Program? 
2. Secondary Research Question 
What are the potential cost implications of the BAMS UAS program for future 
Navy OMN budgets? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
For this thesis, a Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimate for the BAMS Operations and 
Support (O&S) costs was developed based upon previous work completed by McGuire in 
his thesis on the Navy, Unmanned Combat Aerial System (N-UCAS) (McGuire, 2009).  
Actual Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
data for an analogous aircraft system, the P-3C Orion, were used as the basis for creating 
a cost estimation methodology for BAMS UAS O&S costs over the planned operational 
life of the system.  In addition, interviews were conducted with FHP resource personnel, 
Navy Center for Cost Analysis personnel, and BAMS program office personnel. 
The remainder of the data and information needed to answer the research 
questions were collected through review of a sizable number of publications on the 
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BAMS UAS, the Navy FHP, DoD budget procedures and processes, Navy and select 
government reports and instructions, Naval Postgraduate School theses and other topic 
related published articles and research reports. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis contains five chapters. 
Chapter I provides the topic introduction, background, purpose of the thesis, 
research questions and methodology. 
Chapter II contains background information on the budgetary and funding 
procedures and process of the DoD and Navy funding, including the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) and the Navy FHP. 
Chapter III develops the methodology for estimating the BAMS O&S and FHP 
cost estimates utilizing Navy VAMOSC data for an analogous aircraft system. 
Chapter IV provides the analysis of the financial impacts of the BAMS on the 
Navy FHP and OMN budget based upon the cost estimation method developed in 
Chapter III. 
Chapter V summarizes the analysis of qualitative information and quantitative 
data from previous chapters, reports conclusion in answering the thesis research 
questions, and provides topics recommended for further research. 
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II. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDING PROCESS AND 
THE NAVY FLYING HOUR PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the potential cost implications of the BAMS UAS on the Navy’s 
FHP it is necessary to first examine the DoD process for allocating its limited resources 
towards a desired strategic end state through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution System (PPBES).  This system results in the creation of budget documents that 
express in financial terms the plan for accomplishing DoD’s objectives over a given time 
period.  PPBES is an instrument of planning, performance measurement, decision 
making, and management control, as well as a statement of priorities (DON, 2005, p. I–
2). 
The second step is to develop an understanding of the Department of the Navy’s 
FHP, which is the budgeting and accounting process used to allocate resources for 
training air crews and maintaining Navy and Marine Corp aircraft.  The successful 
management of the FHP is essential to naval aviation units accomplishing their assigned 
missions and objectives.  There are numerous levels of FHP managers and comptrollers 
that play a vital role in providing information to build the FHP budget, but the ultimate 
responsibility for budgeting future flying hours is in the hands of Chief of Naval 
Operations Staff (OPNAV), N432D. 
Thus, this chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section provides an 
overview of the DoD budgeting process to give the reader a foundation for understanding 
how funding requirements are submitted by each service.  The second section provides a 
broad overview of the Navy FHP and describes the funding process.  
B. OVERVIEW OF PPBES PROCESS 
PPBES is the process utilized by DoD to answer the budgeting question: how 
should available public resources be allocated among competing programs (Peters, 2007, 
p. 123)?  This complex system was first introduced to DoD by then Secretary of Defense 
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Robert McNamara in 1962.  DoD uses the PPBES process to set priorities, articulate 
department strategies, and allocate scarce resources.  One of its greatest strengths is 
providing long-term stability to defense planning and budgeting.  The process serves 
three primary roles: that of operational control, management control, and strategic 
planning.  Additionally, PPBES has two bottom-line goals: the first is to provide the 
Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) the best mix of forces, equipment, and support 
attainable within resource constraints, and the second is to support the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) in a politically viable fashion (Candreva, 2010, slide 8). 
The PPBES process consists of three forward-looking phases: Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting and one backward-looking phase, Execution (Potvin, 2009, 
p. 38).  Because of the sheer magnitude of the defense budget, the four phases do not 
happen in an orderly sequential manner, but instead occur with a significant amount of 
gaps and overlap.  Figure 2 shows the PPBES process. 
 
Figure 2.   PPBES Process (From Candreva, 2010, Slide 10) 
1. Planning 
The planning phase unlike the other three phases, which have distinct cycles, is a 
continuous process.  This phase begins with the NSS issued by the President based upon 
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input from key officials with national security responsibilities, including the Secretary of 
State, Secretary of Homeland Security, National Security Advisor, SECDEF and others.  
The second key document is the National Defense Strategy.  The SECDEF drafts and 
signs the NDS, which specifies the nation’s strategic objectives and provides further 
guidance and risk management policies.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) is responsible for preparing the third key document, the National Military 
Strategy (NMS), which the SECDEF signs.  This reflects the views of the CJCS and the 
services on the military’s role and the posture of the U.S. in the world environment 
(Potvin, 2009, p. 40).  These planning documents feed each service’s PPBES process and 
are utilized in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), which develops assessments, 
strategy, and program recommendations from a joint perspective, and the Joint Operation 
Planning and Execution System (JOPES), which develops war-fighting plans that drive 
inputs to PPBES. 
The outputs of the two joint planning systems result in the Integrated Priority 
Lists from the COCOMs, Guidance on Employing the Forces (GEF), and Defense 
Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG).  The DPPG provides fiscally constrained 
programmatic guidance and performance measures for military forces, infrastructure 
activities, readiness, sustainability, and force modernization.  The DPPG is also the final 
document within the planning process and is the notional end of the planning phase in 
PPBES.  In reality the process is continuous, with adjustments made as current and future 
capability requirements shift.  Additionally, the DPPG provides the link between the 
planning and programming phases by providing guidance to the service departments for 
development of their program proposals, called the Program Objectives Memorandum 
(POM) (Jarvis, 2006, p. 10).  Figure 3 displays the overlapping and inter-relationship 
between PPBES, JSPS, JOPES and the acquisition process. 
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Figure 3.   PPBES in Relation to Strategic Planning (From Potvin, 2009, p. 41)  
2. Programming 
The programming phase is part art and part science.  The goal is to define those 
programs that will best meet the war-fighter’s needs articulated during the planning phase 
within the existing fiscal constraints (Potvin, 2009, p. 46).  A program is a tangible asset, 
human skill, capabilities, or goods and services that are bought or developed to meet 
DoD’s strategic planning objectives.  Programming begins with the issuance of the DPPG 
and ends with the submission of each service’s POM, which outlines the resources 
needed to accomplish their programs and missions over the next five-year period.  The 
POM is built only during even numbered years and is reviewed and modified in odd 
numbered years to reflect fact-of-life changes, price changes, congressional actions, and 
world events (Potvin, 2009, p. 49).  The CJCS reviews each service’s POM for accuracy, 
program risk assessment, force levels, balance and capabilities and for compliance with 
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the NMS, and JPG.  After the review, the CJCS issues his Chairman’s Program 
Assessment to influence the SECDEF’s decisions delineated in the Program Decision 
Memoranda (PDM) (McCaffery & Jones, 2008, p. 151).  The PDM documents the 
decisions of the SECDEF regarding the content of the POMs; once the PDM are issued 
the programming phase is complete.  
3. Budgeting 
The budgeting phase begins with each military service’s POM and serves to 
justify the programmatic decisions and to request funds for the approved programs.  The 
primary objective of the budgeting phase is to transform the approved POM into a format 
that complies with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directives for federal 
budgeting (Potvin, 2009, p. 50).  However, the POM is not translated directly into the 
budget.  The primary task of budgeting is to request funding that can be executed in the 
fiscal year or for longer terms for multiple year appropriations.  The budgeting phase now 
occurs concurrently with the programming phase.  Each service develops a Budget 
Estimate Submission (BES), which estimates the cost associated with the specified 
resources listed in the POM.  The BES contains four years of budgetary data: the last 
completed year, the current year, and the next two budget years.  The BES documents 
and justifies the decisions made by the services in the POM. 
Once the BES is finalized, the services submit the draft budget for a joint review 
by analysts from OMB and from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller (Jarvis, 2006, p. 11).  The review attempts to ensure that approved programs 
are estimated based on reasonable assumptions and funded according to current fiscal 
policies.  Additionally, the review ensures compliance with the NSS, DPPG and the 
PDM.  If changes are needed, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will issue a Program 
Budget Decision (PBD), which outlines alternatives to the proposed budget. 
The PBD can take three courses of action: (1) approve the exhibits as submitted, 
(2) disapprove some portion of the exhibit by issuing a mark, or (3) approve additional 
resources where shortfalls were detected (Keating & Paulk, 1998, p. 17).  The PBD is 
only a draft until the services have an opportunity to review and reclama (Potvin, 2009,  
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p. 73).  The reclama process is designed to give program sponsors a means to counter 
erroneous assumptions made within a mark.  It should be unbiased, without emotion, and 
address only factual disagreements stated in the mark.  The budgeting phase ends when 
the final DoD budget is submitted to OMB to become part of the President’s Budget. 
4. Execution 
The execution phase, the final step in the PPBES process, is where funds are 
obligated and expended in accordance with the plan set forth in the service’s budget and 
as approved by Congress.  Once Congress passes and the President signs the defense 
appropriations bill, DoD must complete the allotment process before it can begin 
spending any funds.  In the allotment review process, DoD must indicate how it intends 
to spend the appropriated funds, by quarter, month, or fiscal year for multiple year 
appropriations (McCaffery & Jones, 2008, p. 152).  After the Treasury and OMB approve 
the budget execution plan, DoD allocates resources to the services and applicable 
agencies that now have budget authority to incur obligations and make outlays.  Budget 
execution is closely monitored by comptrollers and budget officials to ensure that the 
services spend what was planned in a timely manner per the performance metrics that 
were incorporated into the programming and budgeting phases.  As part of the monitoring 
process, the services conduct a mid-year review to analyze the obligation and expenditure 
rates to facilitate shifting of resources to areas of the greatest need. At the end of the 
fiscal year, each service reconciles its accounts with the appropriations prior to closing 
the accounts from further obligations and outlays to ensure that no Anti-Deficiency Act 
violations occurred (Jarvis, 2006, p. 12).  Table 1 summarizes each phase of the PPBES 
and the resulting outputs. 
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Table 1.   Phases of PPBES (After Keating & Paulk, 1998, p. 19) 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY FLYING HOUR PROGRAM 
The Navy FHP finances the day to day costs of operating Navy and Marine Corps 
aviation units.  This includes air operations, intermediate and organizational maintenance, 
aircrew readiness training, and logistical support activities to ensure aviation forces are 
able to perform their primary mission as required in support of national security 
objectives (OSD, 2009, p. 35).  The FHP is both an accounting and budgeting tool used to 
manage allocated resources and annual flight operations for both active and reserve 
forces.  The ultimate goal of the FHP is to convert the Navy and Marine Corps 
requirements into a budget to provide the necessary resources to the Fleets in support of 
Naval aviation.  The four major claimants, or Budget Submitting Offices, that are 
allocated these resources are Commander Atlantic Fleet (COMLANTFLT), Commander 
Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), Commander Naval Forces Europe (COMNAVEUR), and 
Commander Naval Reserve Forces (Jarvis, 2006, p. 13).  But, the primary management 
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responsibility for the FHP falls upon Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF), the Type 
Commander for naval aviation, as shown in the basic administrative chain of command 
for programming and obligation of FHP funding in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4.   FHP Administrative Chain of Command (From MCO, 2009, p. A–1) 
1. FHP Basic Structure 
The FHP provides the funding for aviation units to train to their primary combat 
mission area readiness levels, conduct peacetime and deployed operations, and perform 
support flights for necessary maintenance and logistics needs.  One of the best definitions 
of the term “Flying Hour Program” comes from Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3125.1B, 
which defines it as the allocation and obligation of funds from the Operation and 
Maintenance, Navy (OMN) and Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve (OMNR) 
accounts for the operation and maintenance of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft (MCO, 
2009, p. 2).  To meet the complex nature of the FHP and maintain its cycle of planning, 
budgeting, execution and reporting requires the integration of several essential programs, 
documents, systems and models (Davis & Nelson, 2009, p. 35). 
a. Training and Readiness (T&R) 
The T&R program sets the basis and guides the development of a 
squadron’s essential war fighting capabilities.  The program provides a standardized set 
of instructions and training requirements for all aviation aircrews for the specified aircraft 
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S).  Every aviation community develops its own T&R syllabus 
to develop core skills and prepare aircrews for combat.  The T&R model provides a direct 
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link between aviation training, readiness, requirements, and resources and standardizes 
the T&R program methodology (MCO, 2009, p. 3). 
b. Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) 
The FRTP is the Navy’s master training plan for all units to meet the 
requirements as set forth in the GEF and is directly linked to the T&R program.  It is a 
27-month cycle that covers six training phases: unit level training, basic/intermediate 
training, advanced training, preparation for overseas movement, deployment, and post 
deployment sustainment (Davis & Nelson, 2009, p. 35). 
c.  Flying Hours Resource Model (FHRM) 
The FHRM utilizes data output from the Aviation Data Warehouse to 
develop flying hour data by T/M/S, which are then input into the Flying Hour Projection 
System (FHPS).  It is a web-enabled transactional system that compiles flight hour 
requirements and calculates readiness ratings and FRP operational availability (Morrison, 
2009, p. 3). The data resident in the Aviation Data Warehouse come from information 
reported by all aviation organizations. 
d. Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS) 
The FHPS is the FHP budgeting model that uses the data output from the 
FHRM along with historical and other relevant aviation data to put a price on flying hour 
requirements.  Additionally, embedded within the model is the Cost Adjustment Sheet 
(CAS) module.  The CAS module works with the FHPS to develop the FHP Budget 
Exhibit, referred to as the OP-20. 
e. Flying Hour Program Budget Exhibit (OP-20) 
The OP-20 is a planning document generated to establish the annual flying 
hours by T/M/S and used for fleet planning and FHP funding decisions (Davis & Nelson, 
2009, p. 37).  It is published by OPNAV Fleet Readiness, office code N43.  The 
document shows each aircraft T/M/S by program element and lists required hours, crew-
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to-seat ratios, budgeted hours, cost per hour by T/M/S, and total T/M/S costs (MCO, 
2009, p. 1–1).  Table 2 is an example of the OP-20 budget exhibit. 
 
Table 2.   OP-20 Display Analysis of Navy Budget Exhibit (From MCO, 2009, p. 1–7)  
2. FHP Funding 
The FHPS model, which captures, stores, tracks, and projects FHP costs, flight 
hours, and aircraft inventory levels, is used to create the required budget exhibits and 
final budget for the FHP (Jarvis, 2006, p. 25).  Near the end of each Fiscal Year (FY), 
OPNAV N43 sends out a memorandum called the “Data call in support of the Flying 
Hour Program Development” for the applicable POM.  The ‘Data Call’ lays out the 
organization and the required reporting action according to five schedules that support the 
OP-20 budget exhibits (Davis & Nelson, 2009, p. 39).  These five schedules display the 
number of aircraft, required versus budgeted flight hours, number of crews, and crew-to-
seat ratios and further break down the FHP funding.  These schedules include: 
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 Schedule A - Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR):  Provides funding for all Navy 
and Marine Corps deployable squadrons, both TACAIR and Anti-
Submarine Warfare, which serve as operational forces in support of 
national objectives.  Schedule A states the minimum number of hours 
necessary to maintain the specified training and combat readiness level for 
each TACAIR squadron. It constitutes the largest portion of the FHP and 
is a common target of budget cuts (Jarvis, 2006, p. 14). 
 Schedule B—Fleet Air Training (FAT):  Funds the Navy and Marine 
Corps advanced training squadrons, referred to as fleet replacement 
squadrons, which train Category I-V aircrews and pilots.  FAT also 
provides funding for the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC), 
which is the primary authority on training and aviation tactics 
development (Jarvis, 2006, p. 15). 
 Schedule C—Fleet Air Support (FAS):  Provides funding for all fleet 
strategic, tactical, and other miscellaneous direct and indirect support and 
logistic flights to Navy and Marine Corps shore bases and operational 
forces (Jarvis, 2006, p. 15). 
 Schedule D—Reserve:  Funds all Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 
squadrons and aviation components.  It covers all flight hours to obtain 
readiness requirements of all tactical and logistic reserve squadrons. 
 Schedule E—Chief of Naval Air Training:  Funds the required hours for 
the training of all basic and intermediate student pilots and aircrew in each 
of the respective Navy and Marine Corps training pipelines. 
The funding for the FHP comes from two appropriations: Operation and 
Maintenance, Navy (OMN), and Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve (OMNR).  
The funding in each appropriation can be further divided for accounting purposes into 
activity groups and sub-activity groups.  The FHP budget authority comes from the sub-
activity groups coded 1A1A Mission and Other Flight Operations within the OMN and 
OMNR appropriations and sub-activity group 1A2A Fleet Air Training within the OMN 
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appropriation.  For FY10 the resources allocated to these three sub-activity groups’ 
totaled $5.7 billion or just over 13 percent of the total OMN and OMNR appropriations 
as shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5.   FY10 FHP Total Obligation Authority (TOA) 
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3. FHP Execution 
As the Type Commander, CNAF has the responsibility for FHP funding 
allocation and execution for Navy and Marine Corps aviation squadrons.  The funding 
received from the OMN and OMNR appropriations is further broken down by CNAF into 
Operational Target Functional Categories (OFCs) or more commonly called Operating 
Targets (OPTARs) as a control means to provide specific guidance on the use of funds 
(either direct or indirect support) and the type of support the funding provides (MCO, 
2009, p. 4–1).  Direct support funds consist of two OFCs, OFC-01 and OFC-50 as shown 
in Figure 7.  MCO 3125.1B defines the two OFCs as: 
OFC-01- Organizational/Squadron Level of Funding:  Identified by funds 
codes 7B for aviation fuels and 7F for flight equipment and administrative 
supplies in direct support of flight operations and aircraft maintenance. 
OFC-50 - Intermediate Maintenance Activity/Organizational Maintenance 
Activity Level of Funding:  Funds support Marine Aircraft Groups, Naval 
Air Station Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, and CV-class 
ships maintenance departments.  Identified by fund code 9S for Aviation 
Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) repairable components and sub-
assemblies, and 7L for aviation fleet maintenance (AFM) non-repairable 
or consumable parts, bit and piece parts, and contract services. 
 
Figure 7.   FHP Funding Composition (From Keating & Paulk, 1998, p. 34) 
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Indirect support, also known as Flying Hour Other (FO) funding, consists of four 
OFCs that provide for operation and maintenance of the aircraft or essential support to 
training, readiness, and maintenance missions (MCO, 2009, p. 4–2).  These four OFCs 
make up only 11 percent of the total FHP costs as shown in Figure 8 and are not 
considered in the cost per hour calculations for operating aircraft, but any underfunding 
of FO accounts will significantly impact the overall FHP. 
 
Figure 8.   FHP Broken Down by Categories (From Morrison, 2009, p. 2) 
The OPTARs are allocated to each major claimant on a quarterly basis through 
grants from CNAF.  COMLANTFLT, COMPACFLT, and COMNAVEUR receive this 
funding and further allocate it to the air station, carrier and squadron levels.  As the 
individual commands incur obligations and make outlays, they are recorded in the Flying 
Hour Cost Report (FHCR) through the command’s submission of its monthly budget 
OPTAR report.  The FHCR is the key source document for cost data, which is used for 
generating future FHP budgets (Jarvis, 2006, p. 17). 
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D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter briefly provides an overview and background information on the 
PPBES and FHP process.  These processes are complex and the objective was to 
highlight key areas and aspects and provide a basic understanding of the processes in 
order to comprehend the content in the following chapters. 
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III. BAMS UAS COST ESTIMATION 
The BAMS UAS program is utilizing an evolutionary acquisition strategy 
incorporating many of the lessons learned during the development and operational 
fielding of the Air Force’s Global Hawk program.  Following the Global Hawk’s path, 
BAMS is an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program, which has had two 
demonstrator systems operating since November 2006 to develop tactics and doctrine for 
employing a HALE UAS (NAVAIR, 2010).  One system was deployed for eight months 
in support of operational missions in the Central Command area of responsibility and 
flew over 60 sorties, totaling more than 800 hours.  This provided not only operational 
experience for employment of the BAMS UAS but also generated useful data on 
potential O&S costs. 
The original intent of this thesis project was to utilize these data as a basis to 
identify the major cost drivers of the future BAMS UAS and create an estimate of the 
FHP costs for BAMS when it reaches its IOC.  However, due to proprietary issues and 
program concerns, the data could not be released.  An alternate analysis was conducted to 
develop an estimate of O&S and FHP costs by utilizing Navy VAMOSC data for an 
analogous aircraft system. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the development and acquisition of any new system within DoD an 
essential step is developing estimates of the system operating and support costs.  
Procedures for estimating a system’s LCC are contained in DoD instruction 5000.4-M, 
DoD Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures.  A systems LCC consists of four major 
cost categories that are associated with sequential but overlapping phases of the system’s 
life cycle (DoD, 2007, p. 2–1).  These four categories are; 1) Research and Development, 
2) Investment, 3) Operating and Support, and 4) Disposal as shown in Figure 9.  A full 
LCC estimate is required for weapon systems at each milestone decision review and 
should incorporate estimates for all four cost categories. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
scope of discussion and analysis of cost implications was limited to O&S costs; thus, the 
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cost estimating methodology focuses on deriving only this value.  The approach taken 
was twofold: first, an O&S cost estimation was derived from VAMOSC data for the 
Orion P-3C; and second, using the estimated cost per hour and information from the draft 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the BAMS UAS, a cost to support each ISR orbit 
was calculated. 
 
Figure 9.   Notional System Life Cycle (From DoD, 2007, p. 2–1) 
B. COST ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
The production and integration of UASs is relatively new, hence few historical 
precedents are available.  The challenge faced by the BAMS program is that the existing 
budgeting and resourcing models for the FHP rely on historical data to generate projected 
costs, but there are no historical data on HALE UAS costs.  While the Air Force Global 
Hawk, which is a HALE UAS and has been operational since 2002, would ideally 
provide a truly analogous system for estimating O&S and FHP costs, it has been 
supported via Contractor Logistics Support (CLS).  Under the existing Global Hawk CLS 
contract, the Air Force only has access to broad aggregated Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) element cost data, which precludes any detailed cost estimating (NCCA analyst, 
personal communication, August 19, 2010). 
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1. System Life and Production Schedule 
In order to calculate an O&S cost estimate, it is essential to identify the planned 
full life expectancy of the system.  Figure 10 shows the notional life expectancies for 
some common classes of defense weapon systems.  For the BAMS program operations 
will begin at IOC in FY16, with a four year ramp-up to FOC in FY20 and will be 
sustained over a 20-year service life (PMA-262b, 2007, p. 5). 
 
Figure 10.   Nominal Service Life Expectancies (From DoD, 2007, p. 5–3) 
The BAMS UAS program has experienced some recent budget funding 
uncertainty during the Program Review (PR) for FY11, which directly impacted the 
original production schedule.  The PR-11 resulted in a reduction of $165 million from the 
BAMS research, development, test, and evaluation funding and resulted in a one year slip 
in the schedule (Dishman, 2009, p. 15).  Using information provided in the BAMS Gantt 
chart shown in Figure 11, and in the BAMS UAS Manpower Estimate Report (MER) 
listed in Table 3, the production schedule was estimated to be four aircraft for FY14 
through FY16 to meet IOC and then seven aircraft starting in FY17 through FY24 to 
meet planned total program procurement of 65 aircraft (Champ, 2010, p. 3).  The full 
estimated production schedule is shown in Table 4. 
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Figure 11.   BAMS Gantt Chart (From Dishman, 2009, p. 16) 
 
Table 3.   BAMS Notional Production Schedule (From PMA-262b, 2007, p. 5) 
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Total 65  
Table 4.   BAMS Estimated Production Schedule 
2. Operations and Support 
The methodology for estimating the O&S costs for BAMS was modeled upon 
previous work completed by Michael McGuire in his thesis on the N-UCAS.  For the 
purpose of this cost estimate all dollar values were converted to FY10 dollars, using 
inflation indices from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis.  The BAMS UAS O&S costs 
were estimated by analogy to the P-3C Orion, Maritime Patrol Aircraft costs.  The P-3C 
is the closest analogous system based upon the following assumptions and limitations: 
 Current maritime ISR missions flown in support of COCOM requirements 
are conducted by P-3C aircraft, BAMS will provide adjunct capability to 
MPRF once operational.  
 MPRF BAMS CONOPS calls for collocation of BAMS UAS squadrons to 
leverage existing P-3C facilities and support infrastructure to more 
efficiently employ MPRF resources. 
 No detailed historical O&S cost data exist for UASs within the Navy 
VAMOSC data base and only detailed production and research, 
development, test and evaluation data exist for the Air Force Global Hawk 
and Predator UASs. 
The WBS for O&S costs and the FY09 costs for the P-3C obtained by VAMOSC 
are in Table 5. 
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TOTAL P-3C FY09
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $223,700,889
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $194,935,358
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Administrative $56,403,997
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $119,293,220
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables $70,738,576
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $159,461,853
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $35,924,055
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $90,848,803
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $91,119,857
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $13,792,309
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $2,504,601
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $4,152,559
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $405,777
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $4,748,621
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $662,124
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $427,375,594
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $3,060,141
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $9,180,651
6.6 Operational Training Costs $6,230,883
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $5,026,015
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $9,721,481
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $16,072,190
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 118
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy 28
Total Aircraft 146
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 62,545
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy 6,027
Total Hours 68,572
Sum Total: ($FY10 Millions) $1,545.36  
Table 5.   O&S Data for P-3C in FY10 Dollars 
The WBS for O&S costs was divided into three basic cost categories to develop 
cost estimation multipliers: 1) Manpower related, 2) Flight hour related, and 3) Number 
of aircraft related.  Tables 6–8 show each WBS element broken down into these 
categories. 
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1.1.1 O rganizational M ilitary Personnel C osts -  O perations
1.2.1 O rganizational M ilitary Personnel C osts -  M aintenance
1.3.1 O rganizational M ilitary Personnel C osts -  Administrative
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores C osts
3.1.1 Intermediate M aintenance Personnel C osts
6.7.1 M aintenance Training C osts
7.1.1 PC S C osts (Indirect support cost)  
Table 6.   Manpower Associated Cost Elements 
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (PO L)
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables)
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular
4.1.1 Aircraft O verhall/Rework
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines O verhall/Rework
4.1.3 Support Equipment O verhall/Rework
4.2.1 N APRA Costs
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support
6.5 Software Maintenance Support
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs  
Table 7.   Flight Hour Associated Cost Elements 
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS)
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation
6.4 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS)
6.6 Operational Training Costs  
Table 8.   Number of Aircraft Associated Cost Elements 
The estimation methodology flowed as follows with associated assumptions: 
 The manpower related cost elements for P-3Cs divided by the number of 
aircraft in the fleet results in a cost per aircraft multiplier.  The BAMS 
manpower costs were determined to be 51 percent of P-3C costs based on 
the following assumptions: 
o BAMS manpower requirement will be filled by 100 percent 
military personnel and will vary between 136 and 199 personnel 
(PMA-262b, 2007, p. 20).  Taking the average of the values gives a 
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notional manning of 168 personnel.  Current average P-3C 
squadron manning is 330 personnel, retrieved from the Navy Fleet 
Training Management and Planning System data base.  The ratio 
of 168 to 330 personnel is approximately 51 percent and provides 
an estimate for associated BAMS manpower costs. 
o The Training Expendable Stores cost element was assumed to be 
zero dollars.  This was based on the CONOPS and program 
information, which states BAMS will not have any offensive or 
defensive weapons capability. 
 The flight hour related cost elements for P-3Cs divided by the number of 
flight hours results in cost per hour multiplier.  The BAMS costs were 
estimated to be directly proportional to the P-3C cost per flight hour with 
the following exceptions: 
o Fuel cost element was further divided by a factor of four to account 
for number of engines on P-3Cs vice a single engine on BAMS. 
o The Support Supplies cost element was estimated to be 70 percent 
of corresponding P-3C costs.  This was based upon 60 percent of 
historical costs coming from non-engine related factors.  The 
remaining 40 percent attributed to engine related costs was divided 
by number of engines on a P-3C, four engines, to estimate cost per 
engine.  The BAMS UAS will have a single engine thus the 
estimated engine related consumable cost of 10 percent was added 
to the 60 percent non-engine related cost to estimate the total 
Support Supplies cost element for BAMS (CTF-57 N3 staff, 
personal communication, September 8, 2010). 
 The number of aircraft related cost elements for P-3Cs divided by the 
number of aircraft in the fleet produces a cost per aircraft multiplier.  The 
BAMS costs were estimated to be directly proportional to the P-3C costs 
with the following exception: 
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o Modification Kit Procurement/Installation cost element for the P-
3C aircraft since 2004 has been skewed because stress fractures 
were discovered in the wings of most of the operational fleet, 
necessitating replacing significant portions of the wings.  To 
estimate a more likely cost structure for BAMS, the average of the 
cost element over the period FY97-03 was calculated.  The ratio of 
the average cost and the cost for FY09 is 33 percent, which was 
applied to P-3C FY09 value. 
A summary of the total P-3C O&S cost elements and the estimated multipliers is 
shown in Table 9. 
TOTAL P-3C with multipliers FY09
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Multiplier
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $223,700,889 $781,421
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $194,935,358 $680,939
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Administrative $56,403,997 $197,028
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $119,293,220 $435
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $70,738,576 $722
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $159,461,853 $2,325
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $35,924,055 $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $90,848,803 $317,349
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $91,119,857 $1,329
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $13,792,309 $201
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $2,504,601 $37
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $4,152,559 $61
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $405,777 $6
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $4,748,621 $69
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $662,124 $4,535
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $427,375,594 $965,986
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $3,060,141 $20,960
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $9,180,651 $134
6.6 Operational Training Costs $6,230,883 $42,677
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $5,026,015 $17,557
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $9,721,481 $142
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $16,072,190 $56,143
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 118
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy 28
Total Aircraft 146
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 62,545
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy 6,027
Total Hours 68,572
Sum Total: ($FY10 Millions) $1,545.36  
Table 9.   Summary of P-3C O&S Cost Elements and Multipliers 
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Tables 10 through 20 summarize the O&S cost estimates by cost element for 
BAMS from FY 2014 through FY 2024. 
Table 10.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY14 
BAMS FY14
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $3,125,684
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $2,723,754
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $788,111
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $817,077
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $1,356,630
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $4,368,818
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $1,269,394
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $2,496,434
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $377,871
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $68,619
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $113,769
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $11,117
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $130,099
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $18,140
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $3,863,944
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $83,839
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $251,525
6.6 Operational Training Costs $170,709
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $70,227
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $266,342
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $224,570
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 4
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 1,879







Table 11.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY15 
BAMS FY15
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $6,251,367
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $5,447,509
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $1,576,221
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $1,634,154
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $2,713,260
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $8,737,636
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $2,538,788
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $4,992,869
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $755,743
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $137,238
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $227,537
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $22,234
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $260,198
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $36,281
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $7,727,887
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $167,679
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $503,049
6.6 Operational Training Costs $341,418
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $140,453
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $532,684
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $449,141
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 8
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 3,757









Table 12.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY16 
BAMS FY16
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $9,377,051
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $8,171,263
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $2,364,332
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $2,451,231
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $4,069,891
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $13,106,454
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $3,808,183
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $7,489,303
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $1,133,614
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $205,858
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $341,306
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $33,352
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $390,298
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $54,421
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $11,591,831
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $251,518
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $754,574
6.6 Operational Training Costs $512,127
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $210,680
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $799,026
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $673,711
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 12
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 5,636









Table 13.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY17 
BAMS FY17
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $14,846,997
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $12,937,833
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $3,743,526
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $3,881,115
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $6,443,994
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $20,751,885
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $6,029,623
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $11,858,064
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $1,794,890
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $325,941
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $540,401
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $52,807
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $617,971
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $86,167
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $18,353,733
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $398,238
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $1,194,742
6.6 Operational Training Costs $810,868
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $333,576
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $1,265,124
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $1,066,709
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 19
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 8,924









Table 14.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY18 
BAMS FY18
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $20,316,944
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $17,704,403
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $5,122,719
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $5,311,000
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $8,818,096
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $28,397,316
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $8,251,062
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $16,226,824
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $2,456,165
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $446,025
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $739,497
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $72,262
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $845,645
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $117,912
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $25,115,634
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $544,957
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $1,634,911
6.6 Operational Training Costs $1,109,609
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $456,472
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $1,731,223
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $1,459,707
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 26
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 12,211









Table 15.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY19 
BAMS FY19
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $25,786,890
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $22,470,973
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $6,501,913
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $6,740,884
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $11,192,199
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $36,042,748
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $10,472,502
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $20,595,584
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $3,117,440
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $566,109
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $938,592
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $91,717
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $1,073,318
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $149,658
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $31,877,536
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $691,676
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $2,075,079
6.6 Operational Training Costs $1,408,350
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $579,369
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $2,197,321
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $1,852,705
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 33
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 15,499









Table 16.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY20 
BAMS FY20
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $31,256,837
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $27,237,543
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $7,881,106
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $8,170,769
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $13,566,302
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $43,688,179
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $12,693,942
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $24,964,344
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $3,778,715
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $686,192
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $1,137,687
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $111,172
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $1,300,992
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $181,404
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $38,639,437
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $838,395
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $2,515,247
6.6 Operational Training Costs $1,707,091
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $702,265
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $2,663,419
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $2,245,703
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 40
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 18,787









Table 17.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY21 
BAMS FY21
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $36,726,783
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $32,004,113
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $9,260,300
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $9,600,653
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $15,940,405
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $51,333,610
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $14,915,382
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $29,333,105
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $4,439,990
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $806,276
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $1,336,783
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $130,627
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $1,528,666
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $213,149
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $45,401,339
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $985,114
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $2,955,415
6.6 Operational Training Costs $2,005,832
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $825,162
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $3,129,518
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $2,638,701
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 47
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 22,075









Table 18.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY22 
BAMS FY22
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $42,196,729
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $36,770,683
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $10,639,494
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $11,030,538
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $18,314,508
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $58,979,042
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $17,136,822
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $33,701,865
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $5,101,265
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $926,359
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $1,535,878
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $150,082
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $1,756,339
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $244,895
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $52,163,240
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $1,131,833
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $3,395,583
6.6 Operational Training Costs $2,304,573
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $948,058
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $3,595,616
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $3,031,699
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 54
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 25,362










Table 19.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY23 
BAMS FY23
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $47,666,676
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $41,537,253
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $12,018,687
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $12,460,422
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $20,688,611
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $66,624,473
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $19,358,262
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $38,070,625
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $5,762,540
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $1,046,443
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $1,734,973
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $169,537
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $1,984,013
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $276,641
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $58,925,142
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $1,278,552
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $3,835,752
6.6 Operational Training Costs $2,603,314
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $1,070,954
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $4,061,715
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $3,424,697
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 61
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 28,650









Table 20.   O&S Estimate for BAMS FY24 
BAMS FY24
Element Level 3 Constant $FY10 Count
1.1.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Operations $50,792,359
1.2.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Maintenance $44,261,008
1.3.1 Organizational Military Personnel Costs - Admin $12,806,798
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $13,277,499
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $22,045,241
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $70,993,291
2.4.1 Training Expendable Stores Costs $0
3.1.1 Intermediate Maintenance Personnel Costs $20,627,656
4.1.1 Aircraft Overhall/Rework $40,567,060
4.1.2 Aircraft Engines Overhall/Rework $6,140,412
4.1.3 Support Equipment Overhall/Rework $1,115,062
4.2.1 NAPRA Costs $1,848,742
4.2.3 Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs $180,654
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $2,114,112
5.3 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services Costs $294,781
6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation $62,789,086
6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support $1,362,392
6.5 Software Maintenance Support $4,087,276
6.6 Operational Training Costs $2,774,023
6.7.1 Maintenance Training Costs $1,141,181
6.7.2 Program Related Logistics Costs $4,328,057
7.1.1 PCS Costs (Indirect support cost) $3,649,268
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy 65
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy 30,529
Sum Total: ($FY10 Millions) $367.20  
 
Table 21 summarizes the O&S cost estimate for BAMS from the end of 
production to the notional end of service life, estimated to be 20 years after BAMS 
reaches FOC in FY20 (PMA-262b, 2007, p. 5).  Table 22 summarizes the BAMS total 
life cycle O&S cost estimate through FY40. 
BAMS FY25-FY40
Total O&S in FY10$ (Millions) $5,875.14  
Table 21.   Combined BAMS O&S Estimate for FY25 through FY40 
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BAMS FY14-FY40
Total O&S in FY10$ (Millions) $7,959.68  
Table 22.   Life Cycle O&S Cost Estimate 
C. FHP COST ESTIMATION 
The O&S cost estimation calculated in Tables 10 through 22 includes several cost 
elements that are not funded under the OMN and OMNR appropriations and thus are not 
funded as part of the FHP.  The FHP is responsible for funding only those costs 
associated with fuel, maintenance consumables, maintenance repairables, and contract 
support as shown previously in Figure 8.  To estimate FHP costs, the definitions of the 
individual cost elements were pulled from the Operating and Support Cost-Estimating 
Guide published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  From these guidelines the 
following cost elements were aggregated to estimate the cost per hour for the BAMS: 
Fuel costs, Support Supplies costs, Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) costs and 
Contractor Logistics Support costs as shown in Table 23.  
2.1.1 Fuel Costs (POL) $435
2.2.1 Support Supplies Cost (Consumables) $722
2.3.1 AVDLR Costs Total Regular $2,325
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support $69
Total Cost per Hour ($FY10) $3,552  
Table 23.   FHP Cost Estimate for BAMS in $FY10 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter developed a cost estimation methodology for the O&S and FHP 
costs associated with operating the BAMS UAS program by applying an analogous 
costing methodology for VAMOSC data for the P-3C.  There are potential accuracy 
issues inherent with this approach.  However, given the absence of access to actual O&S 
data it is the best methodology available to develop reasonable cost estimates and to 
enable analysis of the financial impacts to the FHP that are provided in the next chapter. 
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IV. FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BAMS ON FHP FUNDING 
Because the BAMS UAS program is still in the early stages of its engineering and 
manufacturing development acquisition phase, there is a great deal of uncertainty in what 
the operational and maintenance support structure of a BAMS squadron’s will look like 
at IOC.  No decisions have been made with regards to the number of Primary Aircraft 
Assigned (PAA), crew ratio requirement, crew workload requirements, crew complement 
and manning, Required Operational Capabilities (ROC)/Projected Operational 
Environment (POE), and level of contractor operational and maintenance support.  The 
PAA as well as the ROC/POE will primarily determine the BAMS’s crew ratio 
requirements, T&R matrix, and the associated FRTP, which will drive the required level 
of flight hours to meet BAMS squadrons’ inter-deployment training requirements.  As of 
October 2010, all these documents are still being developed for the BAMS program and 
the final decisions will determine the required level of funding and which appropriation 
will be used to support the final BAMS squadron infrastructure. 
A. FHP IMPACTS 
To analyze the potential impacts of the BAMS UAS on the FHP a two step 
approach was taken: first, the deployed operational flight hour requirements were 
estimated based upon data contained in the BAMS CONOPS and Capabilities 
Development Document (CDD), and second, the T&R flight hour requirements were 
estimated by calculating an estimated PAA and estimated required crew ratio and then 
applying key assumptions and existing FRTP values for manned aircraft.  It is 
acknowledged that the methodology applied is a simplified approach.  The complex 
requirements of developing a new aircraft T/M/S T&R matrix that could accurately 
estimate the potential FHP costs required to prepare a BAMS squadron for deployment is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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1. Estimated FHP Costs 
a. Deployed Operational FHP Costs 
The operational FHP costs were estimated by applying the requirements 
specified in the BAMS CONOPS and CDD, i.e., maintaining continuous coverage of an 
operational area of interest located up to 2000 NM from the launch and recovery base 
(PMA-262a, 2007, p. 8).  Figure 12 illustrates the typical mission profile for the BAMS 
UAS and shows that for any operating area, there will be a BAMS loitering on-station 
performing the mission while a second BAMS will be airborne en-route to relieve the 
first so it can return to base. 
 
Figure 12.   BAMS Typical Profile (From Lim, 2007, p. 37) 
Using basic time-distance calculations, the 2000 NM mission profile 
results in an overlap of BAMS flight time from 6 to 18 hours per day as shown in Figure 
13 or an average of 13 hours where there are two BAMS airborne supporting the mission.  
For the squadron, this means the execution of 37 flight hours per day to support a single 
ISR orbit.  Providing 24-hour coverage for 365 days a year requires 13,505 flight hours 
required per year.  Using the cost per hour estimate from Table 23 of $3,255 per hour 
enables calculation of the estimated operational FHP cost of approximately $43.9 million  
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per BAMS ISR orbit per year.  At FOC this means a minimum FHP cost of $219.8 
million to support the operational requirements of the specified 5 ISR orbits in the CDD 
and CONOPS. 
Day 1
























Figure 13.   Mission Asset Planning Timeline 
b. T&R FHP Costs 
(1) Estimated PAA 
The BAMS CONOPS dictates that a typical mission profile will 
provide continuous ISR operations up to 24 hours per day, over operating areas anywhere 
within a 2000 NM mission radius, with no more than three UAVs aloft at once (PMA-
262a, 2007, p. vi). 
The following assumptions were made to calculate the minimum 
number of BAMS required: 
 BAMS will have a cruise velocity of 340 knots and 
maximum endurance of 30 hours. 
 A returning BAMS will have at least one hour fuel reserve 
upon landing back at base to allow for weather diverts. 
 Time to climb was assumed to be negligible compared to 
BAMS flight endurance.  This is based upon Global Hawk 
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performance data of 3,400 feet per minute rate of climb and 
maximum ceiling of 55,000 feet, thus it takes less than 20 
minutes for it to reach its cruise altitude. 
 Time required for maintenance was assumed to be twelve 
hours after each mission sortie.  This time is based upon the 
normal time needed to refuel, conduct basic maintenance 
inspections, complete routine maintenance repairs, and 
preflight a P-3C (CTF-57 N3 staff, personal 
communication, September 8, 2010). 
 The CDD calls for a minimum effective operational 
availability rate of 80 percent (PMA-262c, 2007, p. 22). 
 Temperature and wind factors were not taken into account 
for transit or loiter time. 
 To ensure meeting operational mission requirements, one 
back-up BAMS UAS will always be available for tasking. 
Figure 14 shows the number of BAMS required to maintain one 
operational ISR orbit for a 24/7/365 on-station mission requirement and is based upon 
on-station time calculations in Table 24.  Thus, to meet the BAMS CONOPS requirement 




Figure 14.   Minimum Number of BAMS Required Versus Distance to Operating Area 
 
O parea  d is tanc e  (N M ) Trans it  Tim e (h rs ) O n-s ta t ion  Tim e (h rs )
500 2 .9 26 .1
1000 5 .9 23 .1
1500 8 .8 20 .2
2000 11 .8 17 .2
2500 14 .7 14 .3
3000 17 .6 11 .4
3500 20 .6 8 .4
4000 23 .5 5 .5  
Table 24.   On-Station and Transit Times Versus Operation Area Distance From Base  
(2) Notional T&R flight hour estimate 
To estimate the number of T&R hours, the following assumptions 
were made: 
 The determining factor for required flight hours is 
predicated on maintaining the minimum proficiency hours 
for BAMS pilots.  All sensor operator training can be 
achieved in conjunction with pilot training hours or in 
simulators. 
 The U.S. Fleet Forces Command and CNAF established an 
FRTP baseline of 16 mean pilot flight hours per month to 
 50
meet manned T/M/S aircraft T&R requirements.  This 
baseline will also apply to the BAMS UAS, see Table 25. 
 Half of the mean pilot flight hour requirements will be 
attained in simulators.  The BAMS MCS will include an 
integrated full mission simulation capability allowing both 
positional and crew mission training (PMA-262b, 2007,  
p. 15).  The objective of the BAMS training development 
program is to support the maximum amount of training 
hours and mission-ready proficiency requirements through 
an integrated and deployable simulator system (PMA-262b, 
2007, p. 14). 
 
Table 25.   Normal Pilot Hours Across FRTP Phases (From Davis & Nelson, 2009, p. 36) 
Using the estimated PAA value from Figure 14 of 5 BAMS per 
squadron and the current P-3C T&R matrix crew ratio of 1.33 crews per aircraft gives an 
estimate of 6.7 crews per squadron, rounding up yields 7 crews per squadron.  Based 
upon the BAMS MER, a BAMS UAS crew will consist of a single pilot in command 
(PMA-262b, 2007, p. 7).  Thus, the required flight hours per crew will be 8 hours per 
month or 96 hours per year, multiplying by 7 crews requires 672 T&R hours per 
squadron per year.  Using the cost per hour estimate from Table 23 of $3,255 per hour 
enables calculation of the estimated T&R FHP cost of approximately $2.2 million dollars 
per squadron per year.  To estimate the T&R FHP costs, as shown in Table 26, an 
equivalent number of BAMS squadrons requiring T&R FHP funding in each FY has to 
be determined.  Accordingly, the following assumptions were made to estimate the 
equivalent number of BAMS squadrons requiring T&R FHP funding: 
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 The war-fighter ISR requirements will be supported first, as 
such BAMS squadrons will deploy to the FIFTH Fleet, 
SIXTH Fleet, and SEVETH Fleet Area of Responsibility 
(AOR) starting at IOC in FY16 through FY18. 
 The SECOND Fleet and THIRD Fleet BAMS ISR orbits 
will be stood up in FY19 and FY20 and supported with 
detachments from BAMS squadrons during their FRTP 
cycle (MPRF staff, personal communication, July 7, 2010). 
o A portion of T&R flying hour requirements for 
squadron aircrew supporting detachments will be 
covered by estimated operational FHP costs. 
o Based upon 24/7/365 on-station operational mission 
requirement at least 50 percent of T&R 
requirements could be met for squadrons supporting 
detachments (MPRF staff, personal communication, 
July 7, 2010. 
 BAMS deployments will be 6 months per existing FRTP 
FY
Equivalent number 
of SQDs executing 
T&R for year












2024 8 $17.50  
Table 26.   Estimated T&R FHP Costs Based on Equivalent Number of Squadrons in T&R 
Cycle for the Year 
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2. Impact of Estimated FHP Costs 
The total BAMS FHP cost estimate by FY is obtained by combining the 
operational and T&R estimates as shown in Table 27.  For FY24 through FY40, the end 
of the BAMS life cycle, the FHP annual cost estimate is $237.3 million.  Based on the 
Navy’s FY10 budget with a current total FHP funding level of $3.9 billion, it can be 
estimated that at the BAMS IOC in FY16 the program will make up 1.3 percent of the 
Navy’s current FHP budget and will grow to 6.1 percent in FY24 when production is 
complete.  While these percentages are small compared to the overall FHP funding level, 
this will create a challenge for CNAF, as the primary manager of FHP execution, due to 
the fact that the BAMS program is not replacing any existing aircraft system.  Thus the 
Navy will face a need to put an increasing amount of resources towards the FHP while 
under growing pressure to reduce overall spending growth levels or it will have to reduce 
the flying hours allocated to other T/M/S aircraft. 
FY













2024 $237.29  
Table 27.   Total BAMS FHP Cost Estimate 
Additionally, the current trend for the cost per hour per aircraft is rising even after 
inflation adjustments are taken into account (NCCA analyst, personal communication, 
August 19, 2010).  This trend is driven by the increasing maintenance costs associated 
with the aging of the existing fleet of aircraft and the increased costs for maintenance 
contracts and parts replacement for new aircraft being introduced into the fleet (NCCA 
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analyst, personal communication, August 19, 2010).  This increasing cost of operating 
aircraft systems directly limits the ability to achieve the required readiness goals per the 
T&R matrix and FRTP throughout naval aviation. 
Another challenge that must be faced is that the BAMS is just one of three UAS 
acquisition Category One programs currently being developed.  The other two are the 
Naval Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS), with a projected IOC sometime after 
FY15, and the Fire Scout Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle 
(VTUAV), which reached IOC in FY10.  Similar to the BAMS program, these UASs will 
not be replacing any existing aircraft systems but will augment existing manned aircraft 
in meeting operational mission requirements.  The growing demand for unmanned 
aircraft appears to have no end in sight, as shown in Figure 15.  This funding level trend 
has resulted in an increase of UAVs from under 250 in 2005 to 600 in 2010, and a 
planned 1400 by 2015, not including the integration of micro UAVs (OSD, 2005, p. 37).  
The long-term DoD and Navy investment strategy is to expand their UAS long-dwell ISR 
capabilities, which have proven invaluable in enhancing situational awareness, protecting 
forces, and targeting the enemy (DoD, 2010, p. 22). 
All of these challenges will put increasing pressure on the FHP and require 
resource execution trade-off decisions to be made by the Navy and by CNAF FHP 
managers on how best to achieve operational and T&R requirements across naval 
aviation. 
 
Figure 15.   DoD Annual Funding for UAS (From OSD, 2005, p. 37) 
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3. Unknown FHP Impact 
A large unknown factor that will affect CNAF’s management of the BAMS FHP 
will be the potential for increased COCOM demand for ISR missions in support of MDA 
(CTF-57 N3 staff, personal communication, September 8, 2010).  The number one 
COCOM priority for unmanned systems is to fulfill ISR requirements with an increasing 
demand for full-motion video and wide area, multi-intelligence search capability (DoD, 
2009, p. xiii).  This was seen with the Navy’s recent deployment of the BAMS 
Demonstrator (BAMS-D) program in December 2008.  The BAMS-D is a Global Hawk 
HALE UAS for developing the Navy’s doctrine and concept of operations for the BAMS.  
The system was deployed to support ISR requirements for U.S. Fifth Fleet with initial 
capability to conduct one 12-hour mission every third day.  After only three weeks in 
theater the COCOM demand signal for ISR support had increased to a 24-hour mission 
requirement every third day (CTF-57 N3 staff, personal communication, September 8, 
2010).  The ISR mission requirement demand would have gone higher but the BAMS-D 
and Air Force Global Hawk assets in theater had to share limited satellite bandwidth that 
precluded more than two HALE UAS assets being airborne at concurrent times (CTF-57 
N3 staff, personal communication, September 8, 2010). 
Additionally, as shown in Figure 15, across DoD the use of UAS in military 
operations has expanded rapidly since the U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan where 
unmanned aircraft have transformed the current battlespace (OSD, 2005, p. i).  Their role 
as reconnaissance only platforms has expanded to include strike, signal collection, and 
force protection.  This has reduced the sensor-to-shooter chain time lag on actionable 
intelligence (OSD, 2005, p. i).  DoD’s approach to integrating unmanned systems has 
been to develop systems that are better suited for missions classified as dull, dirty, or 
dangerous.  A dull mission would be a 40-hour intercontinental strike mission originating 
and terminating in the U.S.  A dirty mission would involve flying into radioactive areas 
for either intelligence collection or fallout sampling.  A dangerous mission involves those 
missions required to penetrate deep over a heavily defended enemy territory (OSD, 2005, 
p. 2).  To meet the growing requirement for these missions, the number of UASs in 
DoD’s inventory increased from 167 to more than 6,000 from 2002 through 2008 (GAO, 
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2010, p. 1).  A prime example of this large demand for UAS ISR missions is shown by 
the U.S. Army’s RQ-7 Shadow UAS which, since its IOC in September 2002, has flown 
over 327,000 flight hours in support of operations in Iraqi and Afghanistan (DoD, 200 9, 
75). Additionally, of the 50 COCOM capability gaps specified in the FY06-11 integrated 
priority lists, 27 (54 percent) are capabilities either currently or potentially addressed by 
UASs (OSD, 2005, p. 41).  This apparent insatiable appetite by the war-fighters may 
potentially drive operational flight-hour requirements even higher than the cost estimates 
calculated for the FHP. 
If the flying hour requirement to support UAS ISR missions in support of 
COCOM tasking grows faster than the Navy’s budgeted FHP, CNAF will be faced with 
the decision on how best to allocate the limited FHP resources to support the war-fighter 
needs.  One practical way to approach this decision process is to evaluate the cost of 
operations between manned versus unmanned aircraft that can successfully accomplish 
the required mission tasking.  Since the P-3C currently provides ISR mission support to 
meet COCOM tasking and the BAMS will do the same once operational, these two 
systems will be the basis for this analysis.  The analysis will be based upon the following 
assumptions: 
 BAMS will have a cruise velocity of 340 knots and maximum endurance 
of 30 hours. 
 P-3C has a cruise velocity of 340 knots and maximum endurance of 10 
hours due to aircrew fatigue limits 
 A returning BAMS will have at least one hour fuel reserve upon landing 
back at base to allow for weather diverts 
 Mission requires a 1000 NM transit to operating area with a persistent ISR 
presence of 23 hours of on-station coverage 
o The 1000 NM is the notional maximum range for P-3C missions to 
obtain a minimum effective on-station of 4 hours. 
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o  The 23 hours on-station coverage is the maximum endurance of 
the BAMS with 6 hours of transit time and a 1 hour fuel reserve 
 Temperature and wind factors were not taken into account for transit or 
loiter time  
As shown in Figure 16, the ISR mission profile requires a single BAMS asset and 
29 flight hours or six P-3Cs flying 59 hours to meet the requirement.  Applying the 
estimated BAMS cost per hour of $3,552 from Table 23 and the cost per hour for P-3Cs 
retrieved from the VAMOSC data base of $5,166 results in total costs of $103,008 for the 
BAMS versus $304,794 for the P-3Cs. 
This analysis shows that the Navy and CNAF would be able to obtain more bang 
for the buck by shifting FHP funding to the BAMS and reduce funding to P-3Cs and still 
ensure full support provided to the war-fighters even in a resource constrained 
environment. 
Day 1























Figure 16.   P-3C versus BAMS Flight Hour Requirement for 23-Hour ISR Mission 
B. OTHER FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF BAMS 
In the course of researching the potential impact the BAMS program will have on 
the FHP funding, several other cost implications were identified that, while not related to 
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FHP, are of significant importance to merit discussion.  All of these costs have the 
potential to significantly impact the larger Navy OMN funding level. 
1. Program Related Logistics (PRL) and Program Related Engineering 
(PRE) Costs 
PRL and PRE costs fall under the umbrella of air system support within the 
Navy’s overall OMN appropriation.  Air system support provides for critical in-service 
engineering and logistics tasks required to maintain safe operations and improve 
readiness, supportability, and affordability of aviation systems.  As shown in Figure 5, it 
makes up 8 percent of the total aviation operations costs or approximately $485 million in 
the FY10 budget.  Within the air systems support cost category, PRL pays for in-service 
systems engineering and logistics support including service use data analysis, systems 
solutions, and field support by technical experts.  While PRE pays for tactical software 
support and maintenance for all Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, including correction of 
software deficiencies, software trouble report triage, fleet technical assists, and updates to 
threat libraries (OPNAVa, 2010, p. 1). 
While there are no current estimates for BAMS PRE and PRL costs, the Navy 
does have PRE and PRL estimates for its Fire Scout VTUAV.  The Fire Scout is being 
developed to provide a similar mission capability to the BAMS, i.e., ISR missions in 
support of MDA for the COCOMs.  The VTUAV estimated PRE cost is $16.1 million 
per year and its estimated PRL cost is $4 million per year (Murphy, 2009, p. 22).  These 
numbers are small compared to the total PRL and PRE costs in the FY10 budget, which 
were $241 million and $139 million, respectively, but show a significant upward trend 
profile in costs as compared to existing aircraft in the fleet.  The upward cost trend is due 
to the increasing software complexity of new aircraft systems, evident in the PRE and 
PRL cost estimates for new manned aircraft systems in development such as the F-35, P-
8, SH-60S and SH-60R (OPNAV N432 analyst, personal communication, August 20, 










Fire Scout $16.1 $4.0
SH-60B $0.9 $1.3
SH-60F $1.0 $1.5
SH-60 R/S $7.3 $10.6  
Table 28.   PRE and PRL Costs Comparison  
2. Satellite Communication Costs 
The BAMS UAS will require at least two dedicated Beyond Line of Sight 
(BLOS) wideband Satellite Communication (SATCOM) links for command and control 
and transmitting mission payload data (Dishman, 2009, p. 5).  While DoD has a robust 
existing SATCOM capability, operational SATCOM requirements continue to expand 
throughout all the COCOMs AORs and have overwhelmed the existing capacity, 
requiring significant commercial SATCOM bandwidth usage as shown in Figure 17.  
These operational communication requirements required approximately 5500MHZ of 
additional bandwidth in FY05 at an approximate cost of $245 million as shown in 
Figure 18. 
 
Figure 17.   Commercial Satellite Bandwidth Usage by Region (From Lim, 2007, p. 47)  
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Figure 18.   Commercial Satellite Bandwidth Costs by Region (From Lim, 2007, p. 47)  
While the BAMS-D was deployed in support of U.S. Fifth Fleet in 2008 through 
2009, it experienced SATCOM bandwidth issues due to the limited availability of DoD 
SATCOM channels (CTF-57 N3 staff, personal communication, September 8, 2010).  
The BAMS-D and Air Force Global Hawk assets in theater had limited SATCOM links 
dedicated to them due to higher priority requirements in the AOR.  Additionally, due to 
the DoD SATCOM signal footprint limitations any missions conducted outside the 
Persian Gulf required use of commercial satellites (CTF-57 N3 staff, personal 
communication, September 8, 2010).  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop a 
cost estimate for the potential SATCOM requirements to support BAMS operations but 
there is a potential significant cost associated with supporting the BAMS and other UAS 
that may be worth follow-on research. 
3. Contractor Operational Support (COS) and Contractor Logistic 
Support (CLS) 
The complete manpower impact of the BAMS UAS is unknown at this time, with 
one of the few known decisions being that the establishment of BAMS squadrons will not 
require an increase in the Navy end strength (PMA-262b, 2007, p. 22).  As part of 
exploring possible manning strategies the BAMS program is conducting cost estimates 
for organic, commercial, or a combination of Military/Civil Service and COS/CLS 
(PMA-262b, 2007, p. 22).  The final BAMS program manpower decisions will have a 
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significant effect on the appropriation that will have to fund the cost of the personnel 
supporting the squadrons.  If the COS/CLS or Civil Service options are selected the 
OMN appropriation will be directly affected.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
develop an estimate for the potential different manpower cost impacts but this area is also 
worth follow on research. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the potential impact of the BAMS program on the FHP and 
also assessed other potential cost impacts to the Navy budget.  The two greatest 
challenges to accomplishing this task were (a) the high degree of uncertainty within the 
BAMS program stemming from key manning, operational, and support decisions yet to 
be made that will determine the life cycle O&S costs, and (b) the effects of the current 
economic and future congressional impacts on DoD’s and Navy’s long-term investment 
planning and resource decision-making for future weapon systems.  The resulting 




The purpose of this thesis was to examine the cost implications of the acquisition 
of BAMS UAS on the FHP and OMN budget.  Chapter II covered the DoD PPBES 
process and the structure of the Navy’s FHP to establish the background needed to 
understand the macro level of the funding process.  Chapter III developed an estimation 
for BAMS O&S costs based upon the nearest analogous manned aircraft data from the P-
3C and built upon the O&S cost estimation to develop an estimated cost per hour.  
Chapter IV analyzed the required level of FHP funding to support BAMS missions 
specified in its CONOPS and examined some of the BAMS impacts on the Navy OMN 
budget.  This chapter will provide answers to the research questions and suggest topics 
for further research. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the cost implications of the Navy’s planned acquisition of the 
BAMS UAS for the Navy Flying Hour Program? 
Beginning in FY14, the BAMS UAS program will begin to require $2.2 million in 
FHP funding, growing to $237.3 million by FY24.  If the FHP remains on a steady 
funding trend, the BAMS program will require over 6 percent of overall FHP funding 
when production is complete and all BAMS squadrons are operational.  The BAMS fleet 
integration will occur without replacement of any existing aviation capability to offset its 
growing FHP resource requirements.  The Navy will either have to request an increase in 
total FHP funding or make resource prioritization decisions within the FHP allocation 
across the aircraft T/M/S within the fleet.  This will compel CNAF, as responsible agent 
for FHP funding allocation and execution, to make hard decisions on which aviation units 
will receive priority for the existing FHP resources. 
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C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the potential cost implications of the BAMS UAS program for the 
Navy’s OMN budget? 
The research performed to complete this thesis identified three areas that will 
directly affect the OMN budget once BAMS reaches IOC and will continue over the 
expected 20-year service life of the system.  These three areas are: (1) larger associated  
PRE/PRL costs versus existing manned aircraft, (2) increased usage and support costs 
associated with commercial wideband SATCOM links, and (3) potential significant 
manpower costs if COS and/or CLS are selected to support operational squadrons. 
Because the BAMS is still early in development in the acquisition process and 
will not reach its Milestone C Decision until mid-2013 there are still many unknown key 
engineering, manpower, operational, and support decisions that will greatly impact the 
costs associated with the three identified areas.  Consequently, prior to completion of this 
thesis no cost estimation methodology was available to forecast the extent that these areas 
will affect the OMN budget.  As a result of the methodology developed and the analysis 
performed for this thesis, it is clear that the size of the BAMS program, with a planned 
procurement of 65 airframes and deployment of 11 operational squadrons, will have a 
significant impact on the FHP and Navy OMN account in the future.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. What Are the Associated Costs and Usage Trends for Commercial 
Satellite Access Within DoD Directly Linked to the Increasing 
Number of Operational UASs?  
The BAMS will be the Navy’s first HALE UAS and only the second such system 
fielded within DoD after the Global Hawk.  The operational construct of a HALE UAS 
varies significantly from the majority of existing UASs within DoD, operating at 
distances requiring BLOS satellite link support for both command and control and 
transmitting mission data.  With the Air Force currently capable of deploying 17 
operational Global Hawk UASs and with a planned procurement total of 54 systems in 
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addition to the Navy’s planned procurement of 65 BAMS, the requirement for SATCOM 
access will become critical to any given AOR requiring the use of commercial SATCOM 
access.  Associated increases in costs to OMN budget accounts will be incurred. 
2. Conduct a Cost Analysis of Leveraging Greater Simulator Training 
for UAS Crews on FHP Funding 
With advances in aviation simulator technology allowing for greater mobility, 
smaller size, and higher fidelity in motion and visual senses, it is becoming possible to 
conduct more realistic training in simulators vice flying in an aircraft.  Historically it has 
been less expensive for aviation units to conduct a training event in a simulator rather 
than an actual aircraft on a cost per hour basis.  It is assumed this trend is true for UAS 
simulators also, but an in-depth analysis of how much training could be conducted for 
UAS in simulators and how much cost savings this would obtain over funding flight 
hours is unknown.  The cost savings are not the only potential advantage as DoD has 
faced challenges in finding enough suitable military controlled airspace to operate and 
train with many UASs due to Federal Aviation Administration restrictions on UAS access 
to civilian controlled airspace. 
3. Cost Benefit Analysis of Implementing Requirement for DoD 
Tracking and Visibility of Operating and Support Costs for UASs. 
According to DoD guidance, each service is to maintain a VAMOSC system 
capable as the authoritative source for the collection of reliable and consistent historical 
O&S cost data for major weapon systems.  The stated objectives of the systems are to 
provide visibility of O&S costs so they may be managed to reduce and control life cycle 
costs as well as improve the estimates of O&S costs for future programs.  For most 
manned aircraft systems extensive data have been and are collected and retained, 
allowing for detailed analogous cost estimations to be conducted for proposed new 
manned aircraft.  A major issue arises with the currently fielded UASs since almost all 
are supported with CLS or Performance-Based Logistic (PBL) contracts. With both CLS 
and PBL, the services lose significant cost data visibility and VAMOSC data input, 
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which impairs future cost estimation and decision making for O&S costs, and often 
contributes to cost growth later in the acquisition process. 
Each of these three areas should be investigated in future research to follow-up 
the work performed for and reported in this thesis. 
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